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Abstract
Male and female social roles are largely predicated on the fact that male
and female reproductive functions are separated in different individuals. This
paper asks why gonochorism rather than hermaphroditism, is the rule among
vertebrates. We argue that hermaphroditism may be unstable in the face of
heterogeneity. Building on the Bateman principle – access to eggs, not sperm,
limits reproductive success – and in line with Trivers-Willard, we show that
low quality individuals will prefer to be all female. Moreover, without sec-
ondary sexual differentiation (SSD), males cannot exist in equilibrium. With
sufﬁcient SSD, however, males may outcompete hermaphrodites. As a result,
while hermaphrodites may coexist with males and females, they mate among
themselvesonly. Thelackofinterbreedingbetweenhermaphroditesandgono-
chorists may form the basis for further speciation. Furthermore, while herma-
phrodites strive to mate their male function and preserve their female function,
equilibrium hermaphroditic mating is reciprocal. Reciprocal mating, in turn,
makes hermaphrodites vulnerable to male-to-male violence, a form of SSD
that may have contributed to the rarity of hermaphroditism.
1 Introduction
Sociobiology traces gender to the different roles of men and women in reproduc-
tion. While sexual reproduction clearly is an important reason for two sexes, our
conception of gender is to a large extent predicated on male and female functions
being separated in different individuals, that is, an organism is either male or fe-
male. However, separated sex functions is only one possibility.
Many plants and some animals (mainly invertebrate) are simultaneous herma-
phrodites, that is, they combine both male and female functions in one organism.
A hermaphrodite incurs the ﬁxed costs of building both sex functions. On the other
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1hand, if the organism itself is considered a ﬁxed cost for the sex functions, herma-
phroditism may be viewed as a low cost alternative. Moreover, unlike gonochorists,
simultaneous hermaphrodites can reproduce with all mature conspeciﬁcs.1
Yet, hermaphroditism is rare among vertebrates and, phylogenically, it is in
decline. The evolutionary basis for its rarity among evolved animals is not well
understood. Ghiselin (1969) pointed to high search cost as a factor in hermaphrodi-
tism, e.g., from high dispersion or low (directed) mobility, an observation consistent
with the prevalence of hermaphroditism among plants and slow moving animals
(e.g., snails). Charnov (1979) pointed to limits on male reproductive success for
understanding stability of hermaphroditism. More recent research has pointed to
limited return to secondary sexual differentiation when the sex functions are bun-
dled in one individual, e.g., Greeff and Michiels (1999). Moreover, Charnov (1982)
suggested that giving up a sex function might be easier than assuming one, which
could be part of the explanation for the decline of hermaphroditism. Yet another
possibility is that intra-genomic conﬂict drives gonochorism, suggested by Hurst
and Hamilton (1992).
This paper focusses on self-incompatible simultaneous hermaphroditism (SH)
in animals. It proposes that such hermaphroditism is not stable in sufﬁciently het-
erogeneous populations, suggesting a possible reason for why hermaphroditism is
rare among evolved animal species. The argument turns on the Bateman princi-
ple, namely that male reproductive success is limited by partner availability, while
female reproductive success is not. Thus, it is closely related to Charnov (1979)
who stressed the role of low mobility or population density in underpinning her-
maphroditism. This paper explores an alternative route by focussing on the role
of heterogeneity. Furthermore, this paper shows that reciprocal mating arises en-
dogenously among simultaneous self-incompatible hermaphrodites, suggesting that
hermaphroditism can only be sustained if reciprocal mating is stable.
This paper builds on Charnov, Maynard Smith, and Bull (1976), who formal-
ized the conditions for dioecy and hermaphroditism under random mating. How-
ever, random mating better describes plants than animals, who, perhaps helped by
their greater ability to search out and/or evade potential partners, have developed
sophisticated strategies for mate choice. Our focus on non-random mating links our
inquiry to the Trivers and Willard (1973) hypothesis that mammals should be able
to inﬂuence the sex ratio of offspring according to parental condition.
2 Model
We consider a population of individuals who can be male, female or both. We index
individuals by their quality, and assume that quality i is uniformly distributed on
[0,1]. Each individual i chooses the type that maximizes reproductive success (RS).
RS depends on the number and quality of offspring. For tractability, we assume that
1While the ﬁxed costs of sex functions are not well known, at least the male reproductive system
is potentially cheap, consisting chieﬂy of a duct to transport sex cells (Charnov (1979)).
2offspring’s quality is solely determined by the father’s quality.2
Following Charnov (1979), we assume that each individual is endowed with a
ﬁxed amount of energy, 1, that can be devoted to reproduction. To build a female
function the individual has to incur a ﬁxed cost of a; to build a male function a ﬁxed
cost of b; a,b > 0 and a+b < 1. Hence, a female can spend 1−a on reproduction,
a male 1−b, and a hermaphrodite 1−a−b. We assume that sperm can be produced
at zero marginal cost whereas the production of eggs is energy consuming. In par-
ticular, we assume that a female can produce ef·r eggs out of an amount of energy r
and normalize ef = 1. Male reproductive success is constrained by partner ability.
Let em (eh in case of a hermaphrodite) be the energy devoted by a male to enhance
eligibility (e.g., improve attractiveness, partner search, competitiveness). Thus, for
a male, the budget constraint is em ≤ 1−b and for a hermaphrodite eh ≤ 1−a−b.
To calculate an individual’s RS we have to consider how quality differences
affect mating decisions. We abstract from sperm competition and assume that a
male (male function) fertilizes all eggs of a partner.3 Since the marginal cost of
sperm is zero, a male (male function) is willing to mate with any female (female
function). In contrast, an individual will be selective in terms of the sperm quality
it accepts.
We restrict our analysis to the case of positive search cost. If there were no
search cost, a male function would only be chosen by the highest quality individual
(since we assume that quality is known at the time of “sex choice” and that sperm
can be produced at zero marginal cost).
Deﬁnition 1 A sub-population is a set of individuals who only mate with individu-
als in the same set.
Deﬁnition 2 We say that hermaphroditic mating is reciprocal if both female func-
tions are mated.
While two hermaphrodites who have mated reciprocally have exhausted their
female functions, they can still use their male function in non-reciprocal matings
with other hermaphrodites or pure females.
Characterization of Equilibria Equilibria can be summarized by the following
partitioning of the unit interval: i ∈ [0,j) are female; i ∈ [j,¯ j1) are hermaphrodites
who only mate with hermaphrodites; i ∈ [¯ j1,¯ j2) are hermaphrodites who mate with
hermaphrodites and females; and i ∈ [¯ j2,1] are male, where 0 ≤ j ≤ ¯ j1 ≤ ¯ j2 ≤ 1.
Depending on the parameter values (capturing search costs, resource constraints,
2There are two ways to justify the assumption that only father’s quality matter. First, our qual-
itative results stand as long as paternal quality matters at all for offspring quality. Second, this
formulation is consistent with female quality varying less than male quality. Lower variation in fe-
male than male quality may stem from the fact that eggs are scarce in reproduction. Thus, we would
expect sexual selection to exert more pressure towards male than female differentiation.
3Sperm competition may be crucial for understanding the existence of male-hermaphroditic pop-
ulations: since hermaphrodites mate reciprocally, copulation alone cannot be the only determinant
of male RS.
3secondary sexual differentiation) some of the subintervals may be degenerate, such
that purely gonochoric or mixed populations may result. However, there is no equi-
librium with only hermaphrodites, except for the limit case of no male ﬁxed cost
(b = 0). Also, the lowest quality interval will always be female (unless b = 0).
Moreover, no pure males can exist without secondary sexual differentiation. Lastly,
reciprocity characterizes hermaphroditic mating.
2.1 Basic Speciﬁcation
Here, we abstract from the role of secondary sexual differentiation (i.e., from ana-
lyzing em and eh). Interestingly, this simpliﬁcation precludes pure males in equi-
librium. We relax this assumption in Section 2.2.
To preview results, equilibria will have the following structure: i ∈ [0,j) are
pure females, and i ∈ [j,1] are hermaphrodites. All hermaphroditic mating is
reciprocal. In addition, hermaphrodites of quality i ∈ [¯ j1,1],¯ j1 ≥ j, will mate with
pure females as well. Whether ¯ j1 = j or ¯ j1 > j will depend on parameter values.
Since there are search costs, females face a trade-off between mate quality and
ﬁnding a mate. For a pure female this trade-off implies that she chooses a threshold
quality¯ j1 above which she accepts any male (or male function). Clearly, individuals
i < ¯ j1 cannot be pure males. However, they may be hermaphroditic. We now turn
to their mating behavior.
The hermaphroditic mating decision is complicated by the fact that the optimal
mating strategy may involve “bundling” of the male and female functions. In par-
ticular, since a hermaphrodite seeks to mate its male function promiscuously while
remaining selective with respect to its female function, hermaphroditic mating may
be reciprocal in equilibrium.
Consider a hermaphrodite of quality i < ¯ j1. It is not accepted by a pure female.
Consequently, it can either do without using its male function – in which case it
might as well dispense with it altogether and spend the freed-up resources on eggs,
i.e., be a pure female – or mate with other hermaphrodites. The reason the latter
might be feasible is that hermaphrodites value access to eggs (unlike pure females).
Thus, a necessary condition for individuals i < ¯ j1 to be hermaphroditic is that
they mate reciprocally. Whether the mating is random or assortative will depend on
search costs. If search costs are low, hermaphrodites will only accept sperm quality
above a threshold value, resulting in assortative reciprocal mating. This is the case
we will focus on.4
Search costs mainly impact the mating behavior of hermaphrodites (as opposed
to gonochorists).5 Hermaphrodites whose quality is below females’ threshold ¯ j1
have to mate reciprocally in order to ﬁnd a mate for their male function. Since
search costs are low, the best type (close to ¯ j1) is only willing to mate its female
4If search costs are high, a hermaphrodite has to seize any mating opportunity that allows RS
through both male and female functions and random reciprocal mating results. However, the equi-
libria in this case are qualitatively similar to the low search cost case.
5This result is an artefact of our assumption that only paternal quality matters for offspring
quality.
4function to another hermaphrodite that is close to its own type. Therefore, it follows
that these hermaphrodites mate assortatively.
The same applies to hermaphroditic mating above ¯ j1. By insisting on reciprocal
mating, hermaphrodites ensure high quality sperm for their eggs. Thus, for high
quality hermaphrodites reciprocal and assortative mating is a best response.
It is straightforward to see that this argument applies if i > (¯ j1 + 1)/2 (if they
were to mate non-reciprocally they would receive the average sperm quality (¯ j1 +
1)/2 as opposed to quality i if mating were reciprocal).
Reciprocityislessobviousforindividualsi ∈ (¯ j1,(¯ j1+1)/2). Theyfaceatrade-
off between sperm quality and mating opportunities for the following reason: the
top hermaphrodites use their female function to buy reciprocity but they can still use
their male function to fertilize other hermaphrodites (in addition to any females).
However, that option exists for any hermaphrodite above ¯ j1 and is not important
for the reasoning within the group of hermaphrodites. Thus, if hermaphrodites
i ∈ (¯ j1,(¯ j1 + 1)/2) were to mate nonreciprocally, they could receive higher sperm
quality. But, as the top individuals’ eggs are no longer available, the lower-quality
hermaphrodites compete with all individuals above¯ j1 for a reduced number of eggs.
Thus, they can either mate reciprocally with a hermaphrodite of the same quality,
or they mate non-reciprocally. In the latter case, their eggs would be fertilized by
higher quality sperm, but they risk to mate their male function with pure females
only. In other words, by giving up reciprocity, they are no longer guaranteed access
to another hermaphrodite’s eggs. For individuals below (¯ j1 + 1)/2 but close to it,
the gain in RS through female function (improved sperm quality) will not outweigh
the loss in RS from male function (fewer fertilized eggs). Thus, reciprocal and
assortative mating is optimal for individuals below but close (¯ j1 + 1)/2. It then
follows that it is also optimal for all hermaphrodites of lower quality. A formal
proof is in the Appendix.
We now state our ﬁrst results:
Lemma 1 Hermaphrodites mate reciprocally.
Lemma 2 If search costs are low, hermaphroditic mating is positive assortative.
Based on these intermediate results we can describe the population structure
that results if individuals choose whether to be male, female or both.
Proposition 1 If there is no secondary sexual differentiation and search costs are
low there are two kinds of Nash equilibria.
1. For any a ∈ (0,1) and b := µ(1 − a), µ ∈ (0,1) there is a Nash equilibrium
with the following structure:
0 < j = ¯ j1 < ¯ j2 = 1,
where j = 2
1−4µ(1 − µ − 1
2
p
3 − 4µ + 4µ2). For µ ∈ [1/2,1], it is unique.
In words, all individuals of quality i ∈ [0,j) choose to be female and accept
any individual i > j as a partner, and all individuals of quality i ∈ [j,1]
choosetobehermaphrodites. Femalesacceptallhermaphroditesaspartners.
52. In addition, for any a ∈ (0,1) and b := µ(1 − a), µ ∈ [0,1/2), and for any
¯ j1 ≥ 1
3−4µ there is a Nash equilibrium with the following structure:
0 < j < ¯ j1 < ¯ j2 = 1,
where j :=
1+¯ j1
4(1−µ). In words, females only accept partners of quality i ≥ ¯ j1,
individuals of quality i < j are female, and individuals of quality i ≥ j are
hermaphroditic.
In sum, Proposition 1 says that females at the bottom and hermaphrodites at the
top characterize equilibria. No equilibrium has only hermaphrodites and there are
no pure males. The intuition for the former is that low quality individuals can do
better as pure females. A proof is in the Appendix. Figure 1 depicts the equilibrium
structure.
Notes: The dashed part of the ﬁgure depicts the distribution of types within the popu-
lation from part 1 of Proposition 1. The dashed line is given by j = 2




3 − 4µ + 4µ2). Individuals whose quality is below j choose to be female, individuals
above j choose to be hermaphroditic. Females accept all hermaphrodites. This equilibrium
exists for all µ ∈ [0,1].
The solid part of the ﬁgure depicts the distribution of types within the population from part




2 , i.e., a value in the middle of the admissible range. Here, all individuals above
j =
1+¯ j1
4(1−µ) choose to be hermaphrodites but females accept only those above ¯ j1.
Figure 1: Distribution of types without secondary sexual differentiation
6The lack of pure males is driven by the absence of secondary sexual differenti-
ation which means that a pure male cannot access more females than a hermaphro-
dite (e.g., from being more attractive or faster). Therefore, hermaphrodites always
have a higher RS than males of the same quality. Consequently, without secondary
sexual differentiation the equilibrium population consists of females and reciprocal
hermaphrodites (the latter mate reciprocally with each other and, obviously, non-
reciprocally with the females).
2.2 Secondary Sexual Differentiation
Males were absent from the equilibria above. Secondary sexual differentiation
(SSD) changes that.6 The assumption that male sex cells are produced at zero mar-
ginal cost implies that high sperm quality is not scarce, and thus female RS hinges
on the quantity of eggs produced. Male RS, on the other hand, increase with greater
partner access, and partner access may be improved by investments in SSD.
Since a male has no alternative uses for the energy endowment 1, we know that
male investment in SSD, em, is:
em = 1 − µ(1 − a).
A hermaphrodite can invest in eggs, and we will assume that it spends a fraction λ
on eggs and the remaining energy on SSD, denoted eh:
eh = (1 − λ)(1 − a − b).
For a general analysis of the population structure, it would be necessary to con-
sider λ as a choice variable of hermaphroditic individuals. However, we focus on
understanding the role of SSD for gonochorism and therefore, we treat λ as a ﬁxed
parameter. Since hermaphrodites can spend less than males on SSD, they may give
it up altogether in favor of egg production. Therefore a λ close to 1 seems therefore
a reasonable assumption.
We parameterize the pure male’s (male) advantage over a hermaphrodite by x,
the ratio of the expected number of female partners of a male and a hermaphrodite
respectively. The empirically relevant range is x > 1.
While females could gain RS by diverting resources into SSD, they do not have
an incentive to do so in our set up. The reason is that there is no female competition
for high quality males.
Again, we focus on the case of low search cost, i.e., hermaphrodites mate assor-
tatively (and reciprocally).7
6The concept was introduced by Darwin who deﬁned it as traits that helped in the competition
for mates, but are otherwise a burden, like the peacock’s tail. He observed that secondary sexual
differentiation is more pronounced among males, or in his words: “If masculine character [is] added
to the species, we can see why young & Female [are] alike[.]” quoted in the Penguin Classics 2004
introduction to The Descent of Man. Secondary sexual differentiation being greater among males is
consistent with the greater variable cost of female sex cells.
7Again, if search cost were high, hermaphrodites would mate randomly. This does not affect the
qualitative characterization of the equilibria, only the values of the cut-off points.
7Proposition 2 For a ∈ (0,1), b = µ(1 − a), µ ∈ (0,1), λ ∈ [0,1] there are the
following Nash equilibria in pure strategies:







, there is an equi-
librium with the following properties (cf. Proposition 1, part 1):
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4λ2(1 − µ)2 + 3 − 4λ(1 − µ)).
2. For µ ≤ 1 − 1
2λ, x ≤ 1 +
8λ2(1−µ)2(1−¯ j1)
1+¯ j1
, there is an equilibrium with the
following properties (cf. Proposition 1, part 2):
0 < j < ¯ j1 < ¯ j2 = 1,
where
j =






4λ(1 − µ) − 1
.
3. For µ ≤ 1 − 1





1+¯ j2−8λ2(1−µ)2}, there is
an equilibrium with the following properties:
0 < j < ¯ j1 = ¯ j2 < 1,
where
j =
1 + ¯ j2
4λ(1 − µ)
and
¯ j2 > max{
1
4λ(1 − µ) − 1
,
−1 + 8λ2(1 − µ)2
1 + 8λ2(1 − µ)2 }.
In words, females accept males above ¯ j2, individuals in [0,j) are females,
individuals in [j,¯ j2), are hermaphrodites, and individuals in [¯ j2,1] are males.
84. If µ > 1− 1
2λ(
√




with females and males only:







In words, all individuals in [0,j) are female and all individuals in [j,1] are
male. Females accept all males as partners.
Proposition 2 describes a possible path towards gonochorism. Part 4 gives con-
ditions for an immediate shift. In Part 3, using deﬁnition 1, the population splits
into a sub-population of hermaphrodites and a sub-population of males and females.
Within the sub-population of of hermaphrodites, the process may start anew, with
the extremes turning gonochoric (females at the bottom and males at the top). Fig-
ure 2 illustrates parts 3 and 4 of the proposition.
Proposition 2 highlights the role of SSD for males, and that males and her-
maphrodites are unlikely to co-exist in equilibrium. This suggests that for (simul-
taneous, self-incompatible) hermaphroditism to exist in “the long run,” a species
either lack “visible” heterogeneity (for instance from living in a habitat that is rich
enough) or the scope for SSD is low (e.g., from low mobility).
3 Discussion
The paper has argued that hermaphroditism is not stable in the face of population
heterogeneity. The reasons are three fold. First, low quality individuals would do
better as pure females if there are ﬁxed costs associated with a sex function. Sec-
ond, females prefer high quality individuals as mating partners. Thus, low and high
quality individuals interbreed, whereas intermediate individuals only mate among
themselves. Third, if there is sufﬁcient scope for secondary sexual differentiation,
it pays for the high quality individuals to be pure males. In that case two sub-
populations form: a gonochoric sub-population consisting of (low-quality) females
and (high-quality) males and a sub-population of hermaphrodites. The remaining
hermaphrodites are less heterogeneous, but within this group the selection process
may start anew. By this logic, a hermaphroditic species may turn gonochoric – un-
less heterogeneity is absent or there is no scope for secondary sexual differentiation
(from anything that caps male reproductive capacity, low mobility being a case in
point).
Phylogenically, hermaphroditismhasgivenwaytogonochorism, andirreversibil-
ity of the latter may be one reason. Charnov (1982):241 wrote “At least one con-
straint hypothesis suggests itself. It may be easier to change from hermaphroditic to
9Notes: The ﬁgure is based on the assumption that only males invest into secondary sexual
differentiation, i.e., λ = 1.
The dashed part of the ﬁgure depicts the distribution of types within the population from
part 4 of Proposition 2. The dashed line is given by j = 1 √
3. Individuals whose quality is
below j choose to be female, individuals above j choose to be males. This equilibrium only
exists for µ ∈ [.317,1].
The solid part of the ﬁgure depicts the distribution of types within the population from part
3 of Proposition 2. The exact distribution depends on ¯ j2. The graph assumes that ¯ j2 is in
the middle of the admissible range. Here, individuals between j =
1+¯ j2
4(1−µ) and ¯ j2 choose to
be hermaphrodites but females accept only males.
Figure 2: Distribution of types with secondary sexual differentiation
dioecious than the reverse. A hermaphrodite need only suppress the development or
use of one sex function; suppression early in development may automatically free
resources for the other sex function. Under dioecy, an individual becoming a her-
maphrodite must build and operate the other sex function. Until the other function
works, selection must operate against diverting resources there.” The development
of SSD, facilitated by gonochorism (dioecy) may be another reason the process
might not easily reverse. Once in place, the existence of SSD may make the male
function of a hermaphrodite uncompetitive and thus redundant.
Male violence is a particularly interesting form of SSD. Our results suggest that
hermaphrodites are particularly vulnerable to male-to-male violence. Since herma-
phrodites mate reciprocally, a hermaphrodite’s female function is not available to
pure males, and thus a hermaphrodite is, in the eyes of a pure male, for practical
purposes a male rival only. Note that male-to-male violence is more debilitating
to the hermaphroditic population than the gonochoric even at similar fatality rates.
10This follows because the death of a pure male does not affect the number of eggs
produced, whereas the death of a hermaphrodite does. Although “male” violence
among hermaphrodites does occur (e.g., marine ﬂatworms, see Michiels and New-
man (1998)), we would expect such violence to be non-lethal.
It has been noted that reciprocal mating results in weaker sexual selection (cf.
strict monogamy among gonochorists). Our paper points to the possibility that
hermaphroditism is only stable if the scope for sexual selection is low (i.e., low
heterogeneity). This is consistent with the Charnov’s observation that reciprocal
mating does not preclude effective polygyny (for an example of sperm competition
and counter strategies, see Haase and Karlsson (2004)).
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Appendix
Proof of Lemmas 1 and 2:
Consider a group of hermaphrodites that mate with each other as males and
females and are, in addition, willing to use their male function when mating with
individuals from another group (females or other hermaphrodites). Reproductive
11success from outside the group is a ﬁxed revenue for all individuals. It is therefore
unmentioned in what follows.
Let the worst quality within this group be j1, the best quality j2. Individuals can
use three different mating strategies within the group of hermaphrodites:
(1) Random, non-reciprocal mating
(2) Random, reciprocal mating
(3) Assortative, reciprocal mating
Assortative, non-reciprocal mating is not a meaningful strategy as the female
function does not contribute to offspring quality. To show that under low search
costs individuals will choose assortative, reciprocal mating, we show ﬁrst that ran-
dom, non-reciprocal mating is dominated by random, reciprocal mating and then
that assortative, reciprocal mating constitutes a Nash equilibrium.
Thus, we compare RS from the ﬁrst two alternatives. If (all) individuals mate
randomly, they receive sperm of quality
j1+j2
2 in expectation. This quality is inde-
pendent of reciprocity. Thus, without search costs there is no difference between
both strategies. If we account for search costs, mating reciprocally reduces search
costs as well as the risk of not ﬁnding a partner. Random, non-reciprocal mating is
therefore dominated by random, reciprocal mating. Random, non-reciprocal mating
is thus canceled from the strategy space under consideration.
To show that assortative mating constitutes a Nash equilibrium needs more con-
siderations. First, it is clear that individuals whose quality is above
j1+j2
2 prefer to
mate assortatively – if search costs are sufﬁciently low – as they have an RS of
2j(1 − a − b)
if mating assortatively and of
j(1 − a − b) +
j1 + j2
2
(1 − a − b)
if mating randomly. The former value is higher than the latter as long as j >
j1+j2
2 .
Individuals of quality j ∈ [j1,
j1+j2
2 ] would receive sperm of – in expectation –
higher quality under random mating than under assortative mating. But, as those in-
dividuals of quality above
j1+j2
2 will mate assortatively and reciprocally, the number
of male and female functions that are to be randomly matched is off balance. For,
individuals above
j1+j2
2 have used their female function for reciprocal mating but
are still willing to use their male function again. Therefore, if individuals of lower
quality (below
j1+j2
2 ) accept sperm from those individuals who have already used
their female function for reciprocal mating, they will forego mating opportunities
for their own male function.
Therefore, individuals of quality j ∈ [j1,
j1+j2
2 ] face three alternatives:
(a) Mate randomly and reciprocally (and, thus, forego high quality sperm) which
leads to RS of





(1 − a − b),
12(b) mate randomly and non-reciprocally (and accept sperm from all individuals
above j1) which leads to RS of
j1 + j2
2
(1 − a − b) + j(1 − a − b)
j1+j2
2 − j1
j2 − j1 | {z }
=1/2
as there are excess male functions and therefore the probability of ﬁnding a mate for
ones own male function is smaller than 1 for an individual of quality j ∈ [j1,
j1+j2
2 ],
(c) mate assortatively which leads to RS of
2j(1 − a − b).
Comparing alternatives (a) and (b) we ﬁnd that for individuals of lower quality
(below
j1+j2
2 ) random, reciprocal mating dominates random, non-reciprocal mating
– that includes all male functions – as long as j1 > 1/3j2. This condition holds in
all scenarios considered throughout the paper as individuals of quality j ≤ 1/3 will
always choose to be purely female and j2 cannot exceed 1. Therefore, alternative
(b) can be ignored.
Comparing alternatives (a) and (c) we ﬁnd that – ignoring search costs – assor-
tative mating is the better strategy for all individuals of quality above
3j1+j2
4 . If we
account for search costs this threshold would be even smaller.
Thus, we have shown that individuals in [
3j1+j2
4 ,j2] will mate assortatively. In-
dividuals in [j1,
3j1+j2
4 ] again face the behavioral alternatives (a), (b), and (c) with
the corresponding – mutatis mutandis – RS. Alternative (b) can again be excluded
if j1 > 1/3j2. From comparison of (a) and (b) we get that individuals of quality
above
7j1+j2
8 prefer to mate assortatively.
Taking that argument ad inﬁnitum we can show that all individuals above j1
prefer to mate assortatively if the best individuals within the group do so. This
behavior is a best response for high quality individuals if search costs are low –
which we assumed. q.e.d.
Proof of Proposition 1:
Part 1: We assume that individuals of quality i < j choose to be female and to
accept males of quality i > j. Then there are j females and 1 − j males and
hermaphrodites. Accordingly, the RS of a hermaphrodite of quality i is given by
2(1 − a − b)i









13Todetermine the threshold j, an individual ofquality j hasto be indifferent between




= 2(1 − a − b)j + (1 − a)j
j
1 − j








3 − 4µ + 4µ2)
which exists and is in [0,1] for all µ ∈ [0,1] except for µ = 1/4, where the function
has a removable pole. Thus, being female and accepting all male functions above
j is a best response to all individuals above j being hermaphrodites and vice versa.
Therefore, j = ¯ j1. As there is no SSD, being pure male does not provide an ad-
vantage in fertilizing eggs but goes at the cost of not having RS from own eggs;
therefore ¯ j2 = 1.
Part 2: However, all hermaphrodites being assortatively reciprocal does not imply
that females accept all hermaphrodites as partners. We now describe the condi-
tions for an equilibrium where individuals below j are female and females choose
a different threshold quality ¯ j1. If there are hermaphrodites below ¯ j1 their RS only
comes from reciprocal matings and is given by
2(1 − a − b)i.
Female RS is now given by
(1 − a)
1 + ¯ j1
2
and RS of a hermaphrodite above ¯ j1 by
2(1 − a − b)i + (1 − a)
j
1 − ¯ j1
.
The lower threshold is again given by indifference between female and hermaphro-
ditic (without additional matings) RS. Using b = µ(1 − a) we get:
(1 − a)
1 + ¯ j1
2
= 2(1 − a − b)j
⇔ j =
1 + ¯ j1
4(1 − µ)
. (1)
To provide a basis for an equilibrium, j and ¯ j1 have to meet two conditions:
(1) j ≤ ¯ j1 which implies that
1
3 − 4µ
≤ ¯ j1, and µ <
3
4
the condition on ¯ j1 given in the proposition.
(2) ¯ j1 ≤ 1 which – following from the ﬁrst condition – implies 1
3−4µ ≤ 1. This
condition holds if µ ≤ 1/2. Again, there is no room for males: ¯ j2 = 1. q.e.d.
14Proof of Proposition 2:
A hermaphrodite spends λ · e on eggs and (1 − λ) · e on matings.
The RS of a male of quality i is given by
i(1 − a)dm,
where dm denotes the expected number of a male’s female partner, and the RS of a
hermaphrodite of quality i under assortative mating is given by
2λ(1 − a − b)i + i(1 − a)dh = 2λ(1 − µ)(1 − a)i + i(1 − a)dh,
where dh denotes the expected number of a hermaphrodite’s female partner. Com-
paring these expressions we obtain
i(1 − a)dm ≷ 2λ(1 − µ)(1 − a)i + i(1 − a)dh
⇔ dm ≷ 2λ(1 − µ) + dh. (2)
That is, the difference in male and hermaphroditic success is independent of
individual quality. Therefore, a pure strategy equilibrium will either result in fe-
males and hermaphrodites or in females and males. Thus, to prove the proposition’s
claims it sufﬁces to show under which conditions a population with hermaphrodites
who mate with females is stable against male invasion and under which conditions
a female-male population is stable against hermaphroditic invasion. Thus, indepen-
dent of equilibrium structure we have ¯ j1 = ¯ j2.
For the female-hermaphrodite equilibria, the population structures are similar
to those of Proposition 1:
(1)Femalesacceptallhermaphroditesaspartnersandallindividualsbelowj are
female and all individuals above j are hermaphrodites. The individual of quality




4λ(1 − µ) − 3




4λ2(1 − µ)2 + 3 − 4λ(1 − µ)).
For λ = 1 this expression is equal to that in proposition 1.
(2) Females accept only hermaphrodites above ¯ j, which leads to a three-layer
population structure: All individuals below j are female, individuals in [j,¯ j1) are
hermaphrodites that do not mate with females, and in [¯ j1,1] there are hermaphro-
dites that do mate with females.
Since individual j needs to be indifferent between being female, earning a RS
of (1 − a)(¯ j1 + 1)/2, and being a hermaphrodite who mate reciprocally and assor-
tatively only, earning a RS of 2λ(1 − µ)(1 − a)j, we obtain
j =
1 + ¯ j1
4λ(1 − µ)
.
15For males to be able to invade, they need to do better than the hermaphrodites
who mate with females. The expected number of matings with females for a her-
maphrodite is dh =
f
h∗ where h∗ varies according to the equilibrium. A male that
invades the population mates with dm = xdh females (cf. page 7). Therefore, from
(2) we know that a male can invade the population if
x
f
h∗ > 2λ(1 − µ) +
f
h∗. (3)












1 − ¯ j1
> 2λ(1 − µ) +
j
1 − ¯ j1
, (5)
where j, ¯ j1 have to be substituted according to the threshold values from proposi-
tion 1. Inequalities (4) and (5) lead to the equilibria in parts 1 through 3 of Propo-
sition 2.
We now turn to proving the speciﬁc parts of the proposition.
Part 1.
Here (4) is the relevant inequality with
j = 2
4λ(1−µ)−3(λ(1 − µ) − 1
2
p
4λ2(1 − µ)2 + 3 − 4λ(1 − µ)). Therefore a fe-




≤ 2(1 − µ) +
j
1 − j




4λ2(1 − µ)2 − 4λ(1 − µ) + (2λ(1 − µ) − 1)
p
4λ2(1 − µ)2 + 3 − 4λ(1 − µ)
2λ(1 − µ) −
p
4λ2(1 − µ)2 + 3 − 4λ(1 − µ)









Here (5) is the relevant inequality, where j =
1+¯ j1
4λ(1−µ); the proposed three-layer
population only exists if µ ≤ 1 − 1
2λ,(λ > 1
2) and ¯ j1 ≥ 1
4λ(1−µ)−1. The condition
for a purely female/hermaphroditic population to be stable is
x
j
1 − ¯ j1
≤ 2(1 − µ) +
j
1 − ¯ j1
⇔ x ≤ 1 + (1 − µ)2
1 − ¯ j1
j
⇔ x ≤ 1 +
8λ2(1 − µ)2(1 − ¯ j1)
1 + ¯ j1
16which proves the claim.
Part 3.
The three-layer equilibrium with females and hermaphrodites can be invaded if (5)
holds which implies that
x > 1 +
8λ2(1 − µ)2(1 − ¯ j1)
1 + ¯ j1
.
In that case males had an incentive to replace those hermaphrodites whose quality
is above ¯ j1; females’ and intermediate hermaphrodites’ incentives are not modiﬁed
by that change as their RS only depends on the fact that there are male functions
above ¯ j1 and is independent of the provider’s sex choice.
Thus, if x > 1+
8λ2(1−µ)2(1−¯ j1)
1+¯ j1 there can be an equilibrium with females below
j, purely reciprocal hermaphrodites in [j,¯ j1), and males above ¯ j1. As ¯ j1 = ¯ j2
and ¯ j2 denotes the threshold between hermaphrodites and males, we replace ¯ j1 by
¯ j2 for the remainder of the proof. This equilibrium however could be invaded by
hermaphrodites. Now, the considerations leading to (5) have to be undertaken from
male perspective.
If there are males only above ¯ j2, their average number of matings is dm =
f
m.
A hermaphrodite invading this population would have dh = 1
xdm matings with
females according to (2). Thus, a hermaphrodite can invade the population if














1 − ¯ j2
> 2λ(1 − µ)
If we substitute j we get
x
￿
1 + ¯ j2
4λ(1 − µ)(1 − ¯ j2)
− 2λ(1 − µ)
￿
<
1 + ¯ j2
(1 − ¯ j2)4λ(1 − µ)
where the bracket is positive as long as ¯ j2 >
−1+8λ2(1−µ)2
1+8λ2(1−µ)2 . Thus, if ¯ j2 sufﬁciently
high, hermaphrodites can invade the population if
x <
1 + ¯ j2
1 + ¯ j2 − 8λ2(1 − µ)2(1 − ¯ j2)
which proves the claim.
Part 4. As we have already shown that males will invade a two-layer popu-







, it remains to show







































If we substitute j into inequality (6), we see that it can only hold (even if x → ∞)
if µ > 1− 1
2λ(
√
3−1). If we solve (6) for x, we get that hermaphrodites cannot invade
the population if x ≥ 1
(1−2λ(
√
3−1)(1−µ). q.e.d.
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